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TENANTS IN SEARCH OF PARITY WITH CONSUMERS:
CREATING A REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS
WARRANTY
I. INTRODUCTION
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) provides consumers
with a set of warranties applying to transactions in goods.' Subsequent to
the U.C.C.'s adoption,2 federal and state legislatures enacted legislation to
further protect consumers However, these laws excluded consumers of
housing-residential tenants.4  To lessen this disparity, courts and
legislatures created an implied warranty of habitability to govern housing
conditions.' Yet, this warranty generally covers only those conditions
endangering the life, health, or safety of the tenant.6 Moreover, the scope,
coverage, and effect of the warranty varies widely among the states,7 and
it does not even exist in some jurisdictions.! Thus, current landlord-tenant
1. See JAMES J. WnrTE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMIERCIAL CODE § 1, at 4-5 (3d
ed. 1988).
2. The District of Columbia, the Virgin Islands, and all states except Louisiana have adopted the
U.C.C. Louisiana has adopted several Articles, but not Article 2 or 2A. UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE,
lB U.L.A. 1 (Supp. 1991).
3. See, e.g., Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C.§§ 2301-2312 (1975); Federal Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1666 (1988); Federal Truth in
Leasing Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1667-1693 (1984); Unif. Consumer Sales Practices Act, 7A U.L.A. §§ 231-
64 (1985).
4. James H. Backman, The Tenant as a Consumer? A Comparison ofDevelopments in Consumer
Law and in Landlord/Tenant Law, 33 OKLA. L. REv. 1, 7-8 (1980). This Note addresses residential
tenants. However, some of the proposals in this Note may be applied to commercial leases as well.
See generally Donald R. Pinto, Note, Modernizing Commercial Lease Law: The Case for an Implied
Warranty of Fitness, 19 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 929 (1985).
5. See infra part II.C. This warranty was based on the theories that old English real property law
was no longer an effective tool for governing the residential lease and that the lease more closely
resembled a contract than a conveyance. Id.
6. The early cases centered on unsafe and unsanitary conditions. See id.
7. See infra part Ill.
8. Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, and Wyoming have not recognized any implied warranty of
habitability. See Deborah H. Bell, The Mississippi Landlord Tenant Act of 1991, 61 MiSs. L.J. 527,
528 n.2 (1991).
The situation in Connecticut is less certain. In a claim arising after the state legislature passed a
statutory implied warranty of habitability, the Connecticut Supreme Court ignored the statute and used
prior caselaw to require the tenant to pay withheld rent even though the East Shore District Health
Department had determined that the premises were not habitable. Johnson v. Fuller, 461 A.2d 988, 990
(Conn. 1983). But see Techer v. Roberts-Harris, 83 F.R.D. 124, 128 n.7 (D. Conn. 1979) (recognizing
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law leaves tenants without the protections afforded other consumers-a
situation that courts and legislators are best positioned to address.'
Legislatures may provide the best avenue for more protections for the
tenant because they can quickly create a uniform body of law. However,
because legislatures are slow to create traditional implied warranties t° and
resist adopting the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act," the
judiciary may have to take this important step in equalizing the tenant's
position with the consumer's position. Courts may follow Solow v.
Wellner,'2 an exemplary decision in which a New York court held that the
state's statutory implied warranty of habitability 3 covers the tenant's
reasonable expectations whether or not the conditions threaten life, health,
or safety.'4
This Note focuses on how the foundations of the implied warranty of
habitability support an extension of the warranty to include the reasonable
expectations of the tenant and how states might effect this greater
warranty. 5 Part II traces the foundations of the warranty as they emerged
in the early exceptions to caveat lessee and finally solidified in the adoption
of the implied warranty of habitability. Part III analyzes the states'
variations in the current implied warranty and the possible justifications for
these differences. Part IV examines how the New York courts have
provided a warranty that a leased premises will meet the reasonable
expectations of the tenant by analogizing the language of New York's
that new Connecticut statute creates an implied warranty of habitability). See generally Marc W.
Vallen, Comment, The Uncertainty of the Implied Warranty of Habitability in Connecticut, 10 U.
BRiDGEPORT L. REV. 465 (1990) (highlighting the Connecticut court's decision in Johnson).
9. See Backman, supra note 4, at 28 (stating that landlord-tenant laws are "appalling" compared
with consumer protection laws).
10. See infra part III.
11. UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT Acr, 7B U.L.A. 430 (1985 & Supp. 1993)
[hereinafter URLTA]. URLTA was promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws and approved by the American Bar Association in 1974 after some modification.
See Steven G. Davison, The Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act and its Potential Effects
Upon Maryland Landlord-Tenant Law, 5 U. BALT. L. REv. 247 (1976). See infra note 95 and
accompanying text for adopting jurisdictions and variations.
12. Solow v. Wellner, 569 N.Y.S.2d 882 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1991).
13. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 235-b (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1994).
14. Solow, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 888.
15. This Note does not attempt to trace the foundation for the warranty in every jurisdiction. Most
courts and legislatures do not clearly indicate a particular foundation. See JESSE DuKEMINIER & JAMES
E. KRIER, PROPERTY 302 (1981) ("In most jurisdictions the source of the warranty is obscure or
polyglot."). Instead, this Note argues that tenants should have a "reasonable expectations" warranty





implied warranty of habitability statute to the U.C.C. Part V argues that an
analogy between different states' implied warranties of habitability and the
U.C.C. supports a more comprehensive warranty for the residential tenant,
but cautions that a landlord should be able to waive warranties relating to
conditions beyond life, health, or safety.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY
Obtaining even the minimum protections of the implied warranty of
habitability was a long and arduous journey. 6 Tenants living with rats,
roaches, and raw sewage often stopped paying rent only to have a court
hold that they owed the withheld rent and future rental payments 7 and
that the landlord was under no obligation to make the dwelling more habit-
able."5 This unusual result occurred because courts applied real property
law to the lease, as they had done since the sixteenth century. t9 Small
exceptions did emerge to alleviate some of the law's harsh results.2"
Significant progress, however, did not begin until 1970. After much
concern about the urban slums and recognition that a lease was more like
a contract, a court finally refused to apply real property law and instead
implied a warranty of habitability.2
A. Real Property Law and the Lease: The Principle of Caveat Lessee
Beginning in the sixteenth century,22 real property law recognized that
the lease gave the tenant property "as is" and the landlord had no duty to
keep the property in a habitable condition or fit for a particular purpose.23
16. For a more complete history of this development, see 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 3.1-
3.103. (A. James Casner ed., 1952 & Supp. 1962); Jean C. Love, Landlord's Liability for Defective
Premises: Caveat Lessee, Negligence, or Strict Liability, 1975 Wis. L. REv. 19.
17. ROBERT S. SCHOSHINSKI, AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT § 3:10 (1980).
18. See, e.g., Pomeroy v. Tyler, 9 N.Y. St. Rep. 514, 515 (1887) ("The landlord, in the absence
of fraud or express condition, is not responsible for the presence of rats, mice, bugs or roaches about
his premises."); Burns v. Fuchs, 28 Mo. App. 279, 281 (1887) ("[T]he lessee is bound to pay rent
according to the terms of the lease notwithstanding the premises may become, during the term, entirely
uninhabitable and useless to him.").
19. See infra part II.A.
20. See infra part II.B.
21. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925
(1970).
22. See I AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 16, § 3.1, at 176; SCHOSHINSKI, supra note
17, § 3:10, at 109. However, Louisiana, has not adopted the common law from England; it has always
viewed the lease as a contract with dependent covenants. See Love, supra note 16, at 93.
23. See Love, supra note 16, at 27-28; 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 16, § 3.45,
at 267. Keeping the premises habitable was one purpose of the implied warranty of habitability.
1994]
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Principles of caveat lessee make the tenant responsible for examining
property before bargaining with the landlord for express warranties.24 In
the absence of express warranties, the landlord was not responsible for
repairing the premises during the tenancy.' In fact, under traditional
property theory, the tenant was responsible for making such repairs so as
not to commit waste.26
Treating a lease as a conveyance of property meant that covenants in the
lease were independent.2 If the landlord breached an express duty within
the lease, the tenant, who covenanted to pay rent, could not withhold rent
or terminate the lease.28 The tenant had to continue paying full rent and
either repair and sue for damages29 or sue for breach of covenant. °
Meanwhile, the landlord did not have to make any repairs and had no
incentive to do so because the tenant was still liable for the rent.3'
Generally, the landlord is not responsible for delivering the property and warranting quiet enjoyment.
See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 16, § 2.47, at 271-72. The warranty of quiet
enjoyment guarantees that the landlord will not interfere with the tenant's enjoyment of the property,
including interfering with possession or harassing the tenant while the tenant is in possession. See I
id. § 2.47, at 272.
24. See Lemle v. Breeden, 462 P.2d 470, 472 (Haw. 1969) (citing 6 SAMUEL WILLISTON, TH1
LAW OF CONTRACTS § 890 (3d ed. 1962)); Pugh v. Holmes, 405 A.2d 897, 900-01 (Pa. 1979) (quoting
Moore v. Weber, 71 Pa. 429, 432 (1872)); 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 16, § 3.45, at
267-69; HERBERT T. TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT § 86, at 556 (1912).
25. See TIFANY, supra note 24, § 86, at 560-61; 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 16,
§ 2.78, at 246-49.
26. 2 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 233 (1993 & Supp.). Waste occurs
when a tenant permissively allows a property to deteriorate or actively destroys part of the premises.
See I AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 16, § 3.7, at 192-94.
27. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 16, § 3.11, at 202.
28. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 17, §§ 2:13-14, at 112-17.
29. Id. Most tenants will not have the resources to make the repairs and pay rent while waiting
to be reimbursed. A repair and deduct remedy is therefore more beneficial because the tenant can
withhold the reasonable cost of repairs from the rent. Also, the prospect that a tenant may withhold
rent is often enough to motivate landlords to repair defects on tenants' terms. However, a tenant who
is not knowledgeable in the law and who does not seek legal assistance may eventually have to pay for
the repair and pay full rent because the tenant must fulfill many specific requirements to legally exact
performance from the landlord. If the tenant does not follow all the requirements, the landlord has a
valid claim for the full rent. One common limitation affecting tenants is the maximum amount they
may deduct for repairs. URLTA allows tenants to deduct the greater of $100 or "an amount equal to
one-half the periodic rent." URLTA § 4.103 (1992). However, other jurisdictions allow a tenant to
accumulate rent in an escrow account to cover major repairs costing more than one month's rent. See
Vallen, supra note 8, at 475.
30. See Vallen, supra note 8, at 475.




B. Exceptions to Caveat Lessee for Residential Leases
When tenants typically rented property for agrarian reasons, the caveat
lessee rule worked because the tenant could readily inspect the land.32
The potential tenant wanted the lease for the land, not the buildings,33 and
such buildings were usually simple enough for the tenant to repair.34
Further, the tenant and landlord had equal bargaining power when deciding
on the terms of the lease, and the tenant could get a landlord to agree to an
express warranty if desired.35 However, as property was sometimes leased
for nonagrarian reasons, courts tried to mitigate the effects of caveat lessee.
Courts carved out exceptions for short-term leases of furnished dwell-
ings.
36
The Massachusetts Supreme Court was one of the first courts in the
United States to imply some type of warranty in a lease. In Ingalls v.
Hobbs,37 the court reasoned that an important element in a lease for a
furnished dwelling is the tenant's expectation of immediate use of the
property and structure as a dwelling.3" Because the lease was for a
furnished place to live for a short term, the landlord could reasonably
expect the tenant to want to live there immediately.39 The court distin-
guished the furnished, short-term lease exception from other leases by
saying that a long-term tenant might want to change the premises to suit his
needs.40
In Delamater v. Foreman,4 another state court followed the Ingalls
trend. The court noted that a tenant in an apartment is not allowed to
32. See SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 17, § 3:10.
33. See 2 POWELL, supra note 26, 233.
34. See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1077 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
925 (1970).
35. See SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 17, § 3:10, at 109-10; 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra
note 16, § 2.45, at 267.
36. See, e.g., Smith v. Marrable, 152 Eng. Rep. 693 (1843). See also I AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY, supra note 16, § 3.45, at 267; 2 POWELL, supra note 26, 233[1][a].
37. 31 N.E. 286 (Mass. 1892).
38. Id. at 286. See also Young v. Povich, 116 A. 26 (Me. 1922) (holding that a short-term lease
of furnished apartment infested with bedbugs at the beginning of the lease violated warranty by
landlord); Morgenthau v. Ehrich, 136 N.Y.S. 140 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1912) (stating that warranty of
availability of furniture in short-term lease for furnished house was breached when bedbugs made
furniture unavailable from the beginning).
39. Ingalls, 31 N.E. at 286.
40. Id. at 287.
41. 239 N.W. 148 (Minn. 1931).
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interfere with the walls, floors, and ceilings where vermin propagate,42 and
therefore, the landlord is responsible for bedbugs within the tenant's
apartment only if they come from common areas.43  The tenant's
expectations and the reality of the tenant's position as to the leased
premises moved the Ingalls and Delamater courts to create these small
exceptions to the caveat lessee principles.'
Courts developed another exception to caveat lessee for situations in
which a tenant could not inspect the premises because construction or
alteration of a building was in progress during the negotiation process and
the lease specified that the building would be used for a particular
purpose.45  Because the tenant could not inspect at the beginning of the
lease, caveat lessee was inappropriate.46 Courts held that the specification
of the building's future use created a warranty of fitness similar to a
contractual warranty.47 Courts would not abandon the notion of a lease
as a conveyance of property, but applied the exception when equity so
demanded.4" However, the arguments for these exceptions undermine the
use of caveat lessee for unfurnished dwellings as well.49
To alleviate further the hardships of caveat lessee, courts began to extend
42. Id. at 149.
43. Id. The tenant's efforts to exterminate the bedbugs did not work, and bedbugs kept entering
the apartment through cracks in the floor. Id.
44. Courts varied on the application of the "furnished-dwelling" exception, but the majority would
only apply it to conditions present at the inception of the lease. See generally 2 POWELL, Supra note
26, 233[1][a]. Courts were split on whether the exception applied to the whole dwelling or only to
the furniture. Id.
45. See generally I AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 16, § 3.45.
46. See 2 POwELL, supra note 26, 233[l][b].
47. See id.
48. Id. Also, a landlord who knew of a latent defect that a prospective tenant might find by
inspecting the property at the beginning of the lease but failed to inform the tenant of the defect was
responsible for any injury to the tenant. The landlord was also responsible for any fraudulent
misrepresentations. See I AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 16, § 3.45, at 269; TIFFANY,
supra note 24, § 86, at 562.
49. If the tenant is renting an unfurnished apartment, the landlord should reasonably expect that
the tenant would like to occupy the dwelling immediately. The tenant should be able to expect a
dwelling free from vermin and suitable for living. The mere absence of furniture should not decrease
the tenant's rights, as long as the premises is rented as a place to live. See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty
Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970) ("[Tenants] seek a well
known package of goods and services-a package which includes not merely walls and ceilings, but
also adequate heat, light and ventilation, serviceable plumbing facilities, secure windows and doors,
proper sanitation, and proper maintenance."). Even when the tenant is afforded the opportunity to
inspect a finished dwelling, the caveat lessee rule is inappropriate because the tenant is not able to




the scope of the warranty of quiet enjoyment." The warranty of quiet
enjoyment holds that when a tenant vacates a premises because the landlord
has substantially interfered with the tenant's possession or enjoyment, the
tenant has been constructively evicted and may terminate the lease."'
However, the tenant must vacate the residence first and then gamble that
a court will find that the premises were uninhabitable.52 Often, however,
the tenant is not able to vacate the premises as no other housing is
available. 3 In response to the limited protection the warranty of quiet
enjoyment provided, isolated courts expanded a tenant's rights by creating
the doctrine of partial constructive eviction whereby the tenant must only
refrain from using the uninhabitable portion of the premises and pay only
part of the rent. 4 Even more helpful for the tenant was constructive
eviction without the vacating requirement. The tenant could stay and
withhold rent until the landlord remedied the problem. However, few
courts adopted these partial "constructive eviction" theories, leaving most
tenants without recourse if a dwelling became uninhabitable.56
C. Rejection of Real Property Law s Caveat Lessee for Residential
Leases
Recognizing the helpless condition of the modem tenant, several
scholarly articles in the 1960s advocated changes from the traditional
application of real property law to the lease. From these articles
50. The warranty of quiet enjoyment is not breached by the landlord's interference with a tenant's
economic, as opposed to possessory, interests. See SCHOSHINSKi, supra note 17, § 3:5. Before it
viewed the lease as a contract, a court would find a covenant not to disturb a tenant's economic interest
independent of the tenant's duty to pay rent. See I AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 16,
§ 2.11, at 203-04. But see University Club of Chicago v. Deakin, 106 N.E. 790 (Ill. 1914) (holding
that in commercial lease, landlord's violation of noncompete clause is ground for termination of lease
by tenant). See also 2 POWELL, supra note 26, 232[l].
51. See I AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 16, § 3.51, at 282.
52. See 2 POWELL, supra note 26, 232[4]. See, e.g., Portal Enter., Inc. v. Cahoon, 715 P.2d
1324 (Nev. 1986); Union Dime Sav. Bank v. Frohlich, 394 N.Y.S.2d 255 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977). But
see Charles E. Burt, Inc. v. Seven Grand Corp., 163 N.E.2d 4 (Mass. 1959) (declaring that a tenant may
litigate the issue of constructive eviction before vacating the premises).
53. See Love, supra note 16, at 36-37.
54. See, e.g., East Haven Assoc. v. Gurian, 313 N.Y.S.2d 927, 928 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1970) (holding
that tenant was constructively evicted from terrace of apartment when ash from incinerator and green
fluid from air conditioner rendered terrace useless).
55. 2 POWELL, supra note 26, 232[3].
56. Love, supra note 16, at 37.
57. See infra note 59.
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emerged two foundations for creating an implied warranty of habitabili-
ty.s8 The first was the need to cure the problem of slums in which low
income and indigent tenants live.59 The second was that because the lease
closely resembles a contract, the parties to it should have the same
contractual rights and remedies as parties in other contexts.6"
Courts also joined the movement for change by recognizing the need to
take greater steps to increase the tenant's bargaining position in relation to
the landlord. Some relied on housing codes designed to eliminate slums
while others based their decisions on the lease as a contract. In Pines v.
Perssion,6" the Wisconsin Supreme Court relied solely on the advent of
building codes and health regulations to find public policy in favor of the
implied warranty.62 In Brown v. Southall Realty Co.,63 the court held the
lease to be an illegal contract because it violated applicable housing
regulations and was thus void.'
A year later, in Lemle v. Breeden,6" a court declared for the first time
58. These articles also focused on other changes, such as rent control and better means of housing
code enforcement. See infra note 59.
59. See, e.g., Paul G. Garrity, Redesigning Landlord-Tenant Concepts for an Urban Society, 46
J. URB. L. 695 (1969) (positing possible solutions to the problem of substandard housing); Joel R.
Levine, The Warranty ofHabitability, 2 CONN. L. REv. 61 (1969) (highlighting the ineffectiveness of
housing code enforcement); Daniel N. Loeb, The Low Income Tenant in California: A Study In
Frustration, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 287 (1970); Carl Schier, Protecting the Interests of the Indigent Tenant:
Two Approaches, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 670 (1966); Robert S. Schoshinski, Remedies of the Indigent
Tenant: Proposalfor Change, 54 GEO. L.L 519 (1966).
60. See, e.g., John Forrester Hicks, The Contractual Nature of Real Property Leases, 24 BAYLOR
L. REV. 443 (1972); Thomas M. Quinn & Earl Phillips, The Law of Landlord-Tenant: A Critical
Evaluation of the Past with Guidelines for the Future, 38 FORDHAM L. REV. 225 (1969) (demonstrating
that current application of real property law to lease is inadequate for multifamily dwellings); Frank F.
Skillem, Implied Warranty in Leases: The Need for Change, 44 DENV. L.. 387 (1967) (stating that
commercial and residential leases should be considered contracts complete with all general contract
warranties).
61. 111 N.W. 409 (Wis. 1961). In Pines, college students rented a house that the landlord
promised to fix and clean, but the landlord left the premises filthy and with defective plumbing, heating,
and electrical wiring. Id. at 413.
62. Id. at 412. In Posnanski v. Hood, 174 N.W.2d 528 (Wis. 1970), the court ignored Pines and
held that "the housing code was not a mutually dependent covenant with a tenant's covenant to pay
rent." Id. at 532. See also Love, supra note 16, at 95 nn.400-01.
63. 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. 1968) (listing defects including broken toilet, railing, and low ceiling
height in basement).
64. Id. at 836. This approach seems to mix the housing code concerns with the contract theory.
Yet, regardless of whether the court wanted the lease to be a contract, the lease was only invalid
because of the code violations, indicating that the court was concerned with maintaining a minimum
housing standard. Id.
65. 462 P.2d 470 (Haw. 1969).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol72/iss1/10
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that a lease was a contract with an implied warranty of habitability66
without referring to any housing codes.67 The court also stressed the
greater remedies available under contract law.6" The court's definition of
breach of the warranty included two general factors: (1) the seriousness of
the defect; and (2) its duration.69
Javins v. First National Realty Corp.7" is the case hailed as the
beginning of the implied warranty of habitability.7t  The United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that violations
of the District's housing regulations were a valid defense to an action
brought by a landlord for eviction of tenants who had withheld rent.72
Although the court articulated several familiar reasons for not following the
common law of caveat lessee,73 two key arguments for implying the
warranty emerged: (1) changes in society compel a shift from the view of
a lease as a conveyance of property to the lease as a contract;74 and (2)
the District of Columbia's housing code mandates the warranty.
75
First, the court reasoned that because the caveat lessee theory was based
on assumptions that no longer hold true, the rule had no rational basis in
today's society.76 To support its assertion, the court found that the typical
66. Id. at 474. Hawaii subsequently passed legislation tying the implied warranty to the housing
codes. HAW. REV. STAT. § 521-42(a)(1) (1985 & Supp. 1991).
67. Although the court never referred to either housing codes or the public policy behind
correcting substandard housing, the tenants had complained of rats, id. at 474, which are specifically
deemed health hazards in most housing codes. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
17920.3(a)(12) (West 1984).
68. 462 P.2d at 475.
69. Id. at 476.
70. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
71. See 2 POWELL, supra note 26, 233[2][a]; Vallen, supra note 8, at 466. Although Lemle is
arguably the first case to imply a warranty of habitability, it is not highlighted as the watershed of
tenants' rights. Perhaps this is because Lemle is only a state court decision, and all eyes were focused
on the District of Columbia Circuit Court, which had a reputation for activism.
72. 428 F.2d at 1072-73.
73. First, the factual assumptions on which the old rule was based have changed. Second,
consumer protection cases require protection for the tenant as well. Third, the nature of urban housing
mandates changing the old rule. Id. at 1077.
74. Id. at 1075. The court stated, "[O]ur holding in this case reflects a belief that leases of urban
dwelling units should be interpreted and construed like any other contract." Id. The court also
mentioned that when a tenant continues to pay the same rent, the tenant should have a right to expect
the same conditions that existed at the beginning of the lease. Id. at 1079.
75. Id. at 1077. "In the District of Columbia, the standards of this warranty are set out in the
Housing Regulations." Id. The court also believed that the housing code itself required the implied
warranty. Id. at 1080. "The duties imposed by the Housing Regulations may not be waived or shifted
by agreement if the Regulations specifically place the duty upon the lessor." Id. at 1081-82.
76. Id. at 1077.
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tenant no longer leases land containing simple structures for agrarian
purposes." Rather, today's tenant faces complex structures which the
tenant may not be able to fix. 78 Additionally, the tenant often may not
have access to the areas where he must make such repairs." Importantly,
the tenant also does not have a sufficient interest in the property to obtain
financing for major repairs."°
The court further argued that the movement toward greater consumer
protection should extend to the landlord-tenant relationship." The court
asserted that tenants, like other consumers, do not have equal bargaining
power with landlords. Landlords usually provide preprinted forms that
favor the landlord, and tenants have little opportunity to change them."
During housing shortages, tenants have even less bargaining power because
few other options exist." Thus, the court concluded that today's urban
society mandates a change from caveat lessee as well as caveat emptor1
4
Second, the court noted that although the District of Columbia's housing
code was silent with respect to private remedies, the language supported an
implied warranty.85 The court also relied on Brown v. Southall Realty
Co., 6 in which the court gave tenants a cause of action under the housing
code after concluding that the code was designed to protect the poor.
87
The court prevented landlords from simply including a waiver of the
warranty in each preprinted lease form by holding that the landlord's
responsibilities under the housing code could not be shifted by contract.88
Citing Javins with approval, courts and legislatures began to change the
law and craft an implied warranty of habitability for residential lessees.
Mirroring Javins, these reforms were supported either by a belief that the
modem landlord-tenant relationship was inconsistent with the foundation
77. 428 F.2d at 1077.
78. Id. at 1078 ("[Tjoday's city dweller usually has a single specialized skill unrelated to
maintenance work; he is unable to make repairs like the 'jack-of-all-trades' farmer who was the
common law's model of the lessee.").
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1078-79.
81. Id. at 1079.
82. 428 F.2d at 1079. See also URLTA § IA03 cmt. (1972).
83. 428 F.2d at 1079.
84. Id. at 1080.
85. Id.
86. 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. 1968).
87. Javins, 428 F.2d at 1080-81. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text for a discussion
of Brown.
88. 428 F.2d at 1081-82.
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of the principle of caveat lessee or by a desire to eliminate substandard
housing."
III. THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY TODAY
States' warranties, whether judicially or legislatively created, vary
widely.90 Significantly, states differ over whether landlords may waive
the warranty and in defining the situations in which the warranty may be
applied. These variations often arise from the two foundations of the
warranty highlighted in Javins.91
A. Survey of the Jurisdictions
As in Javins and Lemle, many courts have created an implied warranty
of habitability,92 which some legislatures later codified.93 In other states,
89. See infra part III.
90. States also differ with respect to the types of damages they will allow if a tenant proves a
breach of the implied warranty of habitability as an affirmative action or as a counterclaim to a rent or
eviction suit. See Debra T. Landis, Annotation, Measure of Damages for Landlord's Breach of the
Implied Warrant
, 
ofHabitability, 1 A.L.R.4th 1182 (1980); Francis S. L'Abbate, Note, Recovery Under
Implied Warrant' of Habitability, 10 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 285, 315 (1982). Rent abatement is the most
common remedy allowed. In one method, the tenant only has to pay the fair rental value of the
property as it existed in its uninhabitable condition. See, e.g., Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791, 797
(Iowa 1972); Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831, 844 (Mass. 1973); Kline v. Burnes,
276 A.2d 248, 252 (N.H. 1971). In Pennsylvania, courts decrease the rent by the percentage of
diminished use. See, e.g., Pugh v. Holmes, 405 A.2d 897, 909 (Pa. 1979) (rejecting use of the
difference in contract rent and fair market value as a measurement because it is impossible to determine
the fair market value of an uninhabitable dwelling).
Courts may also award consequential damages. See, e.g., MeGuinness v. Jakubiak, 431 N.Y.S.2d
755 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980). Some jurisdictions have recognized that it is not only a monetary loss that
the tenant has suffered. Often, tenants have had to change their lifestyles and suffer inconveniences.
See, e.g., Goodman v. Ramirez, 420 N.Y.S.2d 185, 188 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1979) (awarding damages for
disruption of daily living); Gokey v. Bessette, 580 A.2d 488, 492 (Vt. 1990) (compensating for
discomfort of living in an unsanitary dwelling); Hilder v. St. Peter, 478 A.2d 202, 209 (Vt. 1984)
(awarding damages for discomfort and annoyance suffered); Teller v. McCoy, 253 S.E.2d 114 (W. Va.
1978) (awarding damages for the absence of hot water which prevented tenant from taking a bath).
Some courts even allow damages for emotional and mental suffering. Simon v. Solomon, 431
N.E.2d 556, 562-63 (Mass. 1982); Fair v. Negley, 390 A.2d 240, 246 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978). Although
not explicitly allowed under URLTA, courts have implied emotional damages. See Wanda Ellen
Wakefield, Annotation, Tenant's Recovery of Damages for Emotional Distress Under Uniform
Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, 6 A.L.R.4th 529 (1981).
91. See supra text accompanying note 89.
92. Green v. Superior Court, 517 P.2d 1168 (Cal. 1974); Masurv. Eubanks, 401 So. 2d 1328 (Fla.
1981); Lemle v. Breeden, 462 P.2d 470 (Haw. 1969); Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 280 N.E.2d 208 (Il1.
1972); Breezewood Management Co. v. Maltbie, 411 N.E.2d 670 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); Mease v. Fox,
200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972); Steele v. Latimer, 521 P.2d 304 (Kan. 1974); Boston Hous. Auth. v.
Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831 (Mass. 1973); Detling v. Edelbrock, 671 S.W.2d 265 (Mo. 1984)(en banc);
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legislatures have directly codified an implied warranty of habitability,94
many of them adopting the implied warranty contained in the Uniform
Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (URLTA).95  Alabama, Arkansas,
Kline v. Bums, 276 A.2d 248 (N.H. 1971); Marini v. Ireland, 265 A.2d 526 (N.J. 1970); Glyco v.
Schultz, 289 N.E.2d 919 (Ohio Munic. Ct. 1972); Pugh v. Holmes, 405 A.2d 897 (Pa. 1979); Kamamth
v. Bennett, 568 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. 1978); Wade v. Jobe, 818 P.2d 1006 (Utah 1991) (applying general
warranty of habitability to case although state legislature had enacted warranty statute because case
originated before statute became effective); Birkenhead v. Coombs, 465 A.2d 244 (Vt. 1983); Foisy v.
Wyman, 515 P.2d 160 (Wash. 1973); Teller v. McCoy, 253 S.E.2d 114 (,V. Va. 1978).
93. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1941 (West 1985) (enacted 1970); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.51 (West
1987 & Supp. 1993) (enacted 1987); HAW. REv. STAT. § 521-42 (1985 & Supp. 1992) (enacted 1972);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 562A.15 (Vest 1992) (enacted 1978); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2553 (1983) (enacted
1975); MASS. ANN. LAWS cl. 11, §§ 127A-L (Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1993) (enacted 1965); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 441.510 (Vernon 1986) (enacted 1969); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §48-A:14 (1991) (enacted
1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42-88 (West 1987) (enacted 1971); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.04
(Anderson 1989 & Supp. 1992) (enacted 1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1700-1 (1977) (enacted
1966); TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.052 (West 1984 & Supp. 1993) (enacted 1983); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 9, §§ 4457, 58 (Supp. 1993) (enacted 1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.060 (West 1990 &
Supp. 1992) (enacted 1973); W. VA. CODE § 37-6-30 (1985) (enacted 1978).
94. ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.100 (1990) (enacted 1974); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1324 (Vest
1990) (enacted 1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47a-7 (West 1978 & Supp. 1993) (enacted 1979);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5303 (1989) (enacted 1953); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-7-13 (1991) (enacted
1863); IDAHO CODE § 6-320 (1990) (enacted 1977); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 383.595 (Michil/Bobbs-
Merrill Supp. 1992) (enacted 1984); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. arts. 2692, 2693, 2695, 2717 (west 1952)
(enacted 1924); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit 14, § 6021 (West 1980 & Supp. 1992) (enacted 1971); MD.
CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 8-211 (1988 & Supp. 1992) (enacted 1975); MICH. COMP. LAWs ANN. §
554.139 (West 1988 & Supp. 1992) (enacted 1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 504.18 (West 1990 & Supp.
1993) (enacted 1971); Miss. CODE ANN. § 89-8-23(l)(a) (1992) (enacted 1991); MONT. CODE ANN,
§ 70-24-303 (1993) (enacted 1977); NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-1419 (1990) (enacted 1975); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § I18A.290 (Michie 1991) (enacted 1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-8-20 (Michie Supp.
1993) (enacted 1975); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAw § 235-b (McKinney Supp. 1989) (enacted 1975); N.C.
GEN STAT. § 42-42 (1992) (enacted 1977); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-13.1 (1978) (enacted 1977);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, § 118 (West 1986) (enacted 1978); OR. REV. STAT. § 90.320 (1990) (enacted
1973); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-18-22 (Supp. 1992) (enacted 1986); S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-40-440 (Law.
Co-op. 1991) (enacted 1986); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 43-32-8 to -9 (1983) (enacted 1976);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-28-304 (1993) (enacted 1975); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 57-22-1 to -6 (Supp.
1993) (enacted 1990); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.13 (Michie 1986 & Supp. 1993) (enacted 1974); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 704.07 (West 1981 & Supp. 1992) (enacted 1971).
95. URLTA § 2.104 (Supp. 1993). Alaska, Arizona, Kentucky, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico,
Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia codified the implied warranty by
adopting URLTA.
However, some of these jurisdictions have amended the uniform act. For example, the first
provision in the URLTA implied warranty is landlord compliance with "building and housing codes
materially affecting health and safety." URLTA § 2.104(a)(1) (1972). Alaska and Oregon have not
adopted this subsection. Alaska's statute begins with URLTA's second provision-that the landlord
must keep the premises in a "fit and habitable condition." Compare URLTA § 2.104(a)(2) (1972) with
ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.100(a)(1) (1990). The New Mexico legislature changed "fit and habitable" to
read "safe." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-8-20(A)(2) (Michie Supp. 1993). Oregon's statute does not follow
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Colorado, and Wyoming still have the traditional property law of caveat
lessee.96
A few states provide unique restrictions upon the warranty. Tennessee
limits the warranty to counties with a population greater than 200,000,
97
effectively excluding much of the state.9 Similarly, although Kentucky
adopted URLTA,99 the statute is not effective unless adopted by the local
governments, and only Lexington, Louisville, and Covington have taken
this step."° Utah's statute effectively limits the cases in which the tenant
can prevail" 1 by requiring the tenant to notify the landlord of defects
twice before filing a suit.0 2 Tenants must also comply with numerous
provisions of which they may not be aware. 3 Even if the tenant brings
an otherwise successful action, the landlord has the option of evicting the
tenant rather than fixing the defects."
Louisiana is also a unique jurisdiction because its housing code has
always held that a lease is a contract.0 5 The Louisiana housing code
details specific duties the landlord must perform, including keeping the
premises fit for its intended use.'0 6 The strict contract theory allows the
URLTA's warranty and instead provides that a dwelling must be habitable, listing conditions that make
a dwelling uninhabitable. OR REv. STAT. § 90.320(1) (1990). Accord NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
118A.290 (Michie 1991).
Connecticut, North Dakota, Mississippi, Ohio, and West Virginia all have implied warranty statutes
similar to section 2.104 of URLTA although these legislatures have not formally adopted the uniform
act.
96. See Bell, supra note 8, at 528 n.2.
97. TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-28-102 (1993).
98. See Bell, supra note 8, at 528.
99. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 383.595 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1992).
100. See id.
101. See David C. Richards, Comment, The Utah Fit Premises Act and the Implied Warranty of
Habitability: A Study in Contrast, 1991 UTAH L. REv. 55, 68. Richards' Comment was written before
the Utah Supreme Court acknowledged the implied warranty of habitability in Wade v. Jobe, 818 P.2d
1006 (Utah 1991), a case arising before the effective date of the Utah Fit Premises Act. Utah courts
have not yet considered whether the implied warranty from Wade will exist along with the statutory
provision. If it does, the courts can grant an implied warranty even when the tenant does not comply
with the complicated and extensive requirements of the statute.
102. UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-22-6 (Supp. 1993). See also Richards, supra note 101, at 68.
103. See Richards, supra note 101, at 67-68. For example, section 57-22-6(1) requires the tenant
to comply with section 57-22-5. Compliance includes notifying the landlord in writing of any increase
in the number of occupants residing in a dwelling, even a new baby, and securing written permission
for the extra tenants to live there. See Richards, supra note 101, at 67 (discussing requirements Utah
tenants must obey).
104. UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-22-4(4) (Supp. 1993).
105. See Love, supra note 16, at 93.
106. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2692(2) (West 1952).
19941
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landlord and tenant to contract out of any of their statutory duties. Yet, the
courts have often refused to enforce waivers on grounds that the bargaining
power was unequal and the resulting waiver was unconscionable." 7
B. Implied Warranty of Habitability-Waivers and Coverage
The differing foundations of the warranty have created a split among the
states as to whether a landlord may waive the warranty. Preventing a
landlord from waiving the implied warranty is justified by the need to
eliminate substandard housing.'03 Allowing waiver, however, is consis-
tent with contract theory, which states that parties should be free to reach
any agreement, even if one party waives his or her rights. 09 In fact, the
U.C.C. allows waivers of consumer warranties."0 However, courts will
void contractual provisions if they are unconscionable or against public
policy."' Thus, even under contract theory, courts have found waivers
of the warranty void for unconscionability."'
Even if the landlord cannot generally waive the warranty under the
state's law, there are some exceptions. Some jurisdictions specifically
exclude farm tenancies because the foundations for the implied warranty do
not apply." Often, the warranty does not apply to or may be waived for
107. See George M. Armstrong & John C. LaMaster, The Implied Warranty of Habitability:
Louisiana Institution, Common Law Innovation, 46 LA. L. REV. 195, 213-16 (1985).
108. See, e.g., Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831, 843 (Mass. 1973) (finding no
waiver to the extent of State Sanitary Code and local health regulations); Fair v. Negley, 390 A.2d 240,
243-45 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978) (stating that "as is" provision in lease and actual knowledge of defect does
not constitute waiver); Foisy v. Wyman, 515 P.2d 160, 164-65 (Wash. 1973) (holding that due to public
policy concerns no waiver of the warranty is allowed even if at time lease was signed tenant knew of
defects and agreed to reduced rent); Teller v. McCoy, 253 S.E.2d 114, 130-31 (NV. Va. 1978) (finding
any waiver of warranty against public policy because no reasonable person would voluntarily live in
unsafe housing).
109. See, e.g., Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791,797 (Iowa 1970) (stating that waiver is a factor used
to determine if a landlord breached the warranty); Kline v. Bums, 276 A.2d 248, 252 (N.H. 1971)
(following Mease factors); Berzito v. Gambino, 308 A.2d 17, 22 (NJ. 1973) (same); Kamamth v.
Bennett, 568 S.W.2d 658, 662 (Tex. 1978) (holding that waiver is allowed if it is made by express
agreement). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, LANDLORD AND TENANT § 5.6 (1977).
110. See U.C.C. § 2-316 (1977).
111. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (declaring cross-
collateralization clause in installment contract void because it was unconscionable); 1 ARTHUR L.
CoRBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRAcTs § 128 (1963).
112. Louisiana allows waivers of the warranty unless the provision is unconscionable. See supra
note 107 and accompanying text.
113. See, e.g., URLTA § 1.202(7) (1972) (stating that URLTA does note apply to "premises used
by the occupant for primarily agricultural purposes"); IDAHO CODE § 6-320(e) (1990) ("The provisions
of [this section] shall not apply to tracts of land of five (5) acres or more used for agricultural
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single family dwellings. Additionally, some jurisdictions either exempt
landlords of two-, three-, and four-unit buildings or allow these landlords
to waive the warranty."4 Still other states exclude employer-provided
housing.'15
The differences among jurisdictions in the scope of the warranty's
coverage reflects the varying rationales underlying the warranty."6 Some
jurisdictions adhere to the theory that the implied warranty of habitability
arises from building or housing codes." 7  Most jurisdictions rely on
housing codes to limit the warranty to those code provisions that substan-
tially affect life, health, or safety,"8 but some construe literal violations
of the code as breaches of the warranty."9 Even without explicitly tying
purposes.'); MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 8-211(c) (1992 & Supp. 1993).
114. URLTA allows a landlord and tenant of a single family dwelling to agree that the tenant must
provide garbage removal, heat, and hot water. URLTA § 2.104(c) (1972). A single family unit's tenant
may also agree to make minor repairs if the agreement is in good faith. Id. Compare ALASKA STAT.
§ 34.03. 100(c) (1992) (allowing the above URLTA agreements for both one- and two-family residences)
with MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-24-303(3) (1993) (setting the limit at three-family unit buildings) and
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2553(b) (1983) (setting the limit at four-family unit buildings).
URLTA allows all tenants, other than those occupying single-family units, to agree to perform
specific repairs, maintenance, alterations, or remodeling subject to certain conditions, one being that the
landlord must always be responsible for housing code violations. URLTA § 2.104(d)(2) (1972).
Montana allows a shift in responsibilities from landlord to tenant for up to three-family dwellings,
MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-24-303(4) (1993), while Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Virginia allow
any tenants to agree to make such repairs, OR. RV. STAT. § 90.320(2) (1990); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-
18-22(c) (Supp. 1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-28-304(c) (1982); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.13(c)
(Michie 1986).
115. See URLTA § 1.202(5) (1972); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 383.535(5) (Supp. 1992); VA. CODE
ANN. § 55-248-5 (Michie Supp. 1993).
116. See 2 POWELL, supra note 26, 233[2][c].
117. See, e.g., Winchester Management Corp. v. Staten, 361 A.2d 187 (D.C. 1976) (holding that
implied warranty of habitability includes only those conditions contained in the housing regulations);
Green v. Superior Court, 517 P.2d 1168, 1182 (Cal. 1974) (stating that the implied warranty is designed
to cover bare living requirements and does not include perfection or aesthetically pleasing conditions);
Steele v. Latimer, 521 P.2d 304, 309-10 (Kan. 1974) (declaring that the housing code becomes part of
a lease as a matter of law); Detling v. Edelbrock, 671 S.W.2d 265, 270 (Mo. 1984) (en banc) (limiting
warranty to bare living requirements and specifically excluding aesthetically pleasing items) (citing
Green, 517 P.2d at 1182); Glyco v. Schultz, 289 N.E.2d 919, 923-24 (Ohio Munic. Ct. 1972) (holding
that a lease entered into in violation of a housing code is void).
Massachusetts' statute provides for the state and local governments to set up specific codes to
prohibit conditions that "materially impair the health or well-being" of the tenant. MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 111, §§ 127A, 127C (Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1993).
118. See, e.g., Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791,796 (Iowa 1972) (limiting the warranty to material
violations of the housing code that "render the premises unsafe or unsanitary"); Deding, 671 S.W.2d
at 270 ("[Mjinor housing code violations which do not affect habitability will be considered de
minimis.") (quoting King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973)).
119. See 2 POWELL, supra note 26, 233[2][c][ii].
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the implied warranty of habitability to a housing code, some states hold
that the warranty's coverage is limited to provisions generally found in
housing codes. 2
The jurisdictions adhering to the theory that the lease is a contract 2'
do not explicitly limit the standard to conditions endangering the tenant's
life, health, or safety." Yet, most of the cases in these jurisdictions
involve conditions that do violate housing codes or are clearly threatening
to life, health, or safety."2 In isolated cases, courts have required
landlords to do more than simply assure that their premises do not threaten
life, health, or safety. 24  The lease-as-contract foundation does not
mandate a limit on the landlord's duty based upon housing codes."z
C. Inadequacies in the Present State of the Implied Warranty of
Habitability Mandating a More Expansive Warranty
There are two major reasons why courts and legislatures should extend
a greater warranty to residential tenants. First, many of the current implied
warranties of habitability do not provide the intended relief to residential
tenants. Second, residential tenants, as consumers of living space, need
protection for the same reasons consumers of personal goods need it. Thus,
consumers of residential dwellings should receive warranties that further
protect them.
120. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 8-21 1(a) (1992 & Supp. 1993) ("The defects sought
to be reached by this section are those which present a substantial and serious threat of danger to the
life, health and safety of the occupants of the dwelling unit, and not those which merely impair the
aesthetic value of the premises, or... housing code violations of a nondangerous nature.'); N.J. STAT.
ANN. 2A:42-88(a) (vest 1987) (setting the threshold of a breach at a violation of a housing code or
"any other condition dangerous to life, health or safety'); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1700-1 (1993)
(requiring a state official to certify the dwelling as unfit for human habitation in order to declare a
breach of the warranty); TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.052(a)(3) (west 1984 & Supp. 1993) (explicitly
stating that any breach must involve conditions that threaten the physical health and safety of an
ordinary tenant); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-22-4(l) (Supp. 1993) (same).
121. See, e.g., Breezewood Management Co. v. Maltbie, 411 N.E.2d 670, 673 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
Breezewood Management Co. relied upon Weaver v. American Oil Co., 276 N.E.2d 144 (Ind. 1972),
which invalidated exculpatory and indemnification clauses by applying U.C.C. § 2-302, which prohibits
unconscionable contracts. 411 N.E.2d at 673.
122. See, e.g., Timber Ridge v. Dietz, 338 A.2d 21, 23 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1975) (holding that tenant
was entitled to rent abatement when mudslide covered patio, sidewalks, and parking area).
123. See, e.g., Housing Auth. v. Scott, 348 A.2d 195 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973).
124. See, e.g., Timber Ridge, 338 A.2d at 23.
125. See, e.g., Park west Management Corp. v. Mitchell, 391 N.E.2d 1288, 1294 (housing codes
are one factor in determining breach, but are not the conclusive factor), cert. denied, 444 U.S, 992
(1979); Hilder v. St. Peter, 478 A.2d 202, 209 (Vt. 1984) (same).
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The implied warranty of habitability is supposed to safeguard the tenant's
life, health, and safety. 2 6 However, as noted, the warranty in each state
varies widely in terms of the true protection afforded the tenant in these
areas. 27  Procedural impediments12 and outright exceptions 129 create
classes of tenants that have no protection at all. Also, states differ over
what conditions threaten life, health, and safety.30 Often the violations
of which a tenant complains must be egregious before relief is granted.' 3 '
Thus, for many tenants, the current warranties do not even afford a
minimum level of protection against the conditions that they were designed
to protect.
The rationale behind legislation protecting consumers of personal goods
also applies to consumers of living space.' 32 Many of the characteristics
of the modem tenant highlighted in Javins33 are similar to those of other
consumers meriting legal protection.'34 Both tenants and consumers in
today's society cannot meaningfully inspect products and services because
today's goods are too complex.'35 Moreover, the landlord-tenant
relationship, like the consumer-merchant relationship, is not one of equal
bargaining power.'36 In fact, even wealthy tenants may not have enough
bargaining power when there is a housing shortage.
126. See supra notes 118-25 and accompanying text.
127. See supra part II.A.
128. See supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
130. See, e.g., Allaire v. United States Trust Co., 478 F. Supp. 826 (D.V.I. 1979) (holding that a
hole in a porch was not covered by the implied warranty of habitability because a porch is not a vital
facility).
131. See supra note 120.
132. See Backman, supra note 4, at 4.
133. See supra notes 70-89 and accompanying text.
134. See Backman, supra note 4, at 3-I1.
135. See Ross CRANSTON, CONSUMERS AND THE LAw 1-2 (2d ed. 1984); Javins v. First Nat'l
Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1075 (D.C. Cir.) ("[T]he tenant must rely upon the skill and bonafides
of his landlord at least as much as a car buyer must rely upon the car manufacturer."), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 925 (1970). See also id. at 1074 (stating that the "city dwellers, both rich and poor, seek ... a
well known package of goods and services.").
136. See CRANSTON, supra note 135, at 3 ("Consumers are typically in a weak bargaining position
because of the disparity in knowledge and resources between the parties."); Tower West Assoc. v.
Derevnuk, 450 N.Y.S.2d 947, 952 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1982) (recognizing the middle-class tenant as "the
tenant who is not poor enough to elicit the customary sympathies ... nor wealthy enough to move the
powers that be").
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IV. NEW YORK'S EXTENSION OF THE IMPLIED WARRANTY
OF HABITABILITY
When New York codified the implied warranty of habitability in
1975,'3 the legislature gave no indication that the warranty was anything
more than a means to alleviate the abhorrent conditions in urban slums.'
However, courts have interpreted the statute's language to extend the
warranty beyond conditions affecting life, health, or safety.'39 For
example, in Solow v. Wellner,"4° the court held that the presence of mice
and roaches violated the implied warranty of habitability because this
condition affects the tenants' health and safety.41 However, the court
continued to analyze other alleged violations in terms of the statutory
language guarantying that "the premises . . . are fit for . . . the uses
reasonably intended by the parties."'42 The court reasoned that because
this language is similar to U.C.C. section 2-315,113 the legislature
intended the implied warranty to extend as far as the U.C.C."
The court then determined whether the landlord in Solow had breached
the warranty with respect to these other conditions by using the test New
York traditionally employs under U.C.C. section 2-315-the reasonable
137. N.Y. R.AL PROP. LAW § 235-b (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1994). For a discussion of the
development of the implied warranty of habitability in New York before Solow v. Wellner, 569
N.Y.S.2d 882 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1991), see L'Abbate, supra note 90, at 297-301. See also Armstrong &
LaMaster, supra note 107, at 204.
138. See Governor's Memorandum of Approval, 1975 N.Y. LAwS 1760.
139. See, e.g., Walling v. Holman, 858 F.2d 79, 83 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that under New York
law, warranty is not limited to conditions that endanger life, health, and safety), cert. denied, 489 U.S.
1082 (1989); Tower West Assoc. v. Derevnuk, 450 N.Y.S.2d 947, 951 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1982) (holding
that a tenant has the right to expect to receive reliable services, such as an intercom system, elevator
service, heat, and hot water), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 992 (1979); Mantica R. Corp. v. Malone, 436
N.Y.S.2d 797, 799 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1981) (interpreting the warranty to guaranty a dwelling that is (1) not
dangerous to life, health, or safety, (2) habitable and usable, and (3) in accord with reasonable
expectations).
140. 569 N.Y.S.2d 882 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1991).
141. Solow, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 887. Other conditions affecting the tenant's health and safety in Solow
were exposed wires in the lobby, the absence of elevators for those living above the tenth floor,
accumulating garbage, unlocked doors, malfunctioning smoke alarms, collapsing ceilings, and
overflowing sinks. Id.
142. Id. at 887-88. "By adopting the phraseology 'the uses reasonably intended by the parties,' the
legislators manifested their desire that the warranty of habitability in residential tenancies paralleled the
warranty of fitness in commercial transactions under U.C.C. section 2-315." Id.
143. U.C.C. § 2-315 reads, "there is... an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such
[ordinary] purposes." U.C.C. § 2-315 (1977).




expectations of the consumer. 45  In this case, the tenants' expectations
were based on the location of the building, the architectural design, and the
amount of the rent. 46  The apartment building was on Manhattan's
Upper East Side and had won architectural design awards. 47 The rents
ranged from approximately $1000 to $5400 per month. 48 From these
facts and from descriptions in a brochure 49 that the landlord used in
leasing the apartments, the court concluded that the tenants had a
reasonable expectation of having a clean, well-run apartment building. 5
Because breach of the implied warranty of habitability is a defense to a suit
for rent,' the court held that a breach of a tenant's reasonable expecta-
tions is also a defense if the landlord institutes against the tenant a
summary proceeding for nonpayment of rent. 52
V. EXTENDING THE U.C.C. ARTICLE Two WARRANTIES TO
RESIDENTIAL LEASES
The same bases from which the traditional implied warranty of
habitability' 53 originated support judicial extension of the warranty.
Because some legislatures have never attempted to codify warranties,5 4
courts' interpretations of statutes and caselaw will be the only means by
which to extend the warranty in many jurisdictions. For example, in
Solow, a New York court took the language of a state statute and
145. Id. at 887.
146. Id. at 888.
147. Id. at 884.
148. Id.
149. The brochure contained a floor plan and a listing of features including the following
descriptions: "Panoramic views of New York City, its rivers and bridges; ... Private membership...
[to] Pool Club. 24 hour attended lobby.... Four pipe central air conditioning system providing a
choice of cooling and/or heating during transitional seasons. Air conditioned lobby and corridors....
46th floor laundry room with spectacular city views.... 4 high speed Otis elevators equipped with
intercom phone .. " The lease specifically included the brochure as part of the lease while excluding
any oral statements made by the leasing agent. Solow, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 884-85.
150. Id. at 888. Because the lease specifically included the brochure as part of the agreement, the
court could have decided this case in the tenant's favor based on breach of an express covenant. See
SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 17, § 3:13.
151. See, e.g., Park West Management Corp. v. Mitchell, 391 N.E.2d 1288, 1293 (N.Y. 1979)
(allowing the tenant to use the implied warranty of habitability as a defense to landlord's summary
nonpayment proceeding).
152. Solow, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 888.
153. The "traditional warranty" refers to the warranty of conditions threatening to life, health, and
safety. See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
154. Illinois and Indiana have developed an implied warranty through caselaw. See supra note 92
and accompanying text. See supra note 8 for jurisdictions with no implied warranty of habitability.
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analogized it to a U.C.C. warranty in order to create a "reasonable
expectations" warranty.' 5 Some state statutes lend themselves to this
analogy, or at least do not preclude an extension," 6 while statutory
language in other jurisdictions makes a successful analogy impossible 5 1
unless the statutes are bypassed altogether."' Yet, both the traditional
reasons for the warranty and an analogy to consumer law support extending
the warranty or creating a new warranty encompassing the reasonable
expectations of the tenant.'59
155. See supra part IV.
156. See infra note 177 for analogies between state implied warranty of habitability statutes and
U.C.C § 2-314.
157. Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Utah have
warranty statutes focusing on threats to life, health, and safety. See supra notes 93-94. Statutes in
Oregon, Nevada, and New Hampshire specifically list the conditions that make a dwelling uninhabitable,
leaving no general standard by which to analogize the U.C.C. warranties. See supra notes 93-94. The
Florida statute, mandating compliance with housing and building codes, additionally lists conditions of
habitability if there is no code. See supra note 93.
158. See infra note 177 for an argument that the existence of a statute granting an implied warranty
of habitability does not preclude a tenant from obtaining a remedy by using a consumer law analogy.
Cf Citaramanis v. Hallowell, 613 A.2d 964, 975 (Md. 1992) (allowing tenants to bring action under
Consumer Protection Act for landlord's failure to license property as required by law); Love v. Amsler,
441 N.W.2d 555, 560 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (applying Prevention of Consumer Fraud Act to landlord-
tenant relationship). See also David L. Johnson, Note, Necessity or Overkill? Regulating Residential
Landlord-Tenant Relations Through the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1063
(arguing that in light of the perceived uselessness of the Utah Fit Premises Act, the Utah Consumer
Sales Practices Act may provide tenants with a cause of action against a landlord for unfair or
unconscionable acts). However, most of these consumer protection statutes require proof of fraud or
deception and will not cover many situations that an implied warranty of reasonable expectations would
cover. See infra part V.B.
159. However, the economic arguments against implying the warranty of habitability do not support
an argument against implying a reasonable expectations warranty.
One argument against the traditional implied warranty of habitability is that it will not provide better
housing for the poor because it will increase the cost of low-income housing and decrease the supply.
Complying with the warranty would require a landlord to raise rents in order to cover the cost of
repairs. Therefore, if the landlord could not raise rents high enough to make a profit, the landlord
would abandon the rental business thus removing his or her buildings from the housing market. See
Edward H. Rabin, The Revolution in Residential Landlord-Tenant Law: Causes and Consequences, 69
CORNELL L. REv. 517, 558-63 (1984). See also Levine, supra note 59, at 89-93; Love, supra note 16,
at 111.
Joel Levine is skeptical of such arguments: drug, appliance, utility, and insurance companies made
similar arguments when legislatures considered greater regulations affecting them, yet after the
legislation went into effect, the ill consequences predicted did not occur. See Levine, supra note 59,
at 80-91. Additionally, Duncan Kennedy specifically rejects the economic arguments based on his own
economic analysis of the housing situation. Duncan Kennedy, The Effect of the Warranty of
Habitability on Low Income Housing: "Milking" and Class Violence, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 485
(1987).
These arguments do not apply to the proposed reasonable expectations warranty because the landlord
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REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS WARRANTY
A. Traditional Reasons for the Implied Warranty Support an Expansion
of the Warranty by the Judiciary
The traditional reasons for the implied warranty of habitability support
extending the warranty to cover the consumer's reasonable expectations.
Changes in today's society from the time of the agrarian tenant apply not
only to the low-income tenant, but to any residential renter.16° The
middle- to high-income tenant is similarly incapable of inspecting today's
complex buildings.' These tenants, whether low or high-income,
generally do not have the skills, access, or sometimes, the financial
resources to fix defects. 62 This inability applies equally to defects that
threaten life, health, and safety and to those that do not. 63
The consumer protection movement also supports the extension of the
implied warranty of habitability."6 Tenants whether low-, middle-, or
high-income still do not have equal bargaining power with landlords. 65
Landlords proffer preprinted form leases to tenants that favor the landlord's
position.'66 In some situations, the leasing agent of the building may not
even be authorized to make changes on these forms at the tenant's request.
A greater income does not assure that a tenant has more knowledge and
expertise with respect to a residential lease. Most tenants will always have
less knowledge and experience than the landlord.
A possible counterargument is that more affluent tenants do have the
means to both inspect the premises and equalize the bargaining power by
is free to contract out of this warranty. See infra part V.D. The author recognizes that landlords will
incur the transaction costs associated with modifying existing lease forms to include such waivers.
However, these costs will not be great. Moreover, revised form leases, would emerge soon after the
creation of a new law, further decreasing the cost to each individual landlord.
160. See SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 17, § 3:14. Some of the reasoning in this section may support
extending warranties to commercial leases as well. See generally Pinto, supra note 4.
161. See CRANSTON, supra note 135, at 1-2 (arguing that consumer protection is necessary because
the consumer, even if sophisticated, is unable to inspect meaningfully products and services because
modem goods are complex).
162. See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1078-79 (D.C. Cir.) (recognizing that
tenants will not have the necessary resources), cert denied, 400 U.S. 425 (1970).
163. See id.
164. For similarities between tenants and consumers of goods, see Backman, supra note 4, at 3-11.
165. See CRANSTON, supra note 135, at 3 ("Consumers are typically in a weak bargaining position
because of the disparity in knowledge and resources between the parties."); Backman, supra note 4, at
3. See also supra note 136.
166. See Backman, supra note 4, at 3.
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hiring a building inspector 67 and an attorney. Then, a tenant could
supposedly bargain for express warranties to cover current and potential
future defects highlighted by the inspector with the attorney providing the
bargaining power to insure the items appear correctly in the lease. This
argument first assumes the tenant is aware that it is worthwhile to spend
financial resources in order to equalize his or her bargaining power with the
landlord. t6 Second, it assumes a free market in which the tenant is able
to rent elsewhere if the landlord does not agree to the express warranties.
In many areas, housing shortages exist for all income levels, so the tenant
will not have equal bargaining power regardless of how many experts are
hired. 169
Additionally, although the housing codes used to imply warranties of
liability only affect conditions threatening life, health, and safety, public
policy concerns in general favor the protection of all consumers.' Thus,
the traditional reasons for implying a warranty of habitability also lend
support to an extension of the warranty to include situations not threatening
to life, health, and safety.
B. U. C.C. Warranties as a Basis for Judicial Expansion of the Implied
Warranty of Habitability
An analogy between the warranty of habitability and U.C.C. Article 2
warranties can be employed to imply a warranty that a leased premises will
be suitable for the type of living the tenant reasonably expects.'
7
Although the U.C.C. warranties do not expressly apply to leases of real
167. See Daniel P. Schwallie, Note, The Implied Warranty of Habitability as a Mechanism for
Redistributing Income: Good Goal, Bad Policy, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 525, 528 n.15 (1989-90).
168. See Alex Y. Seita, Uncertainty and Contract Law, 46 U. PTrr. L. REv. 75, 134-36 (1984)
(asserting that consumers only read contracts and consult an attorney for interpretation if the expected
loss is high, as with the purchase of a home). Renting a home or apartment may not seem important
to many prospective tenants, especially those who have a short-term lease of one or two years or who
asses their investment in terms of monthly rent rather than the total rent due under the lease.
169. See Vallen, supra note 8, at 474.
170. See supra note 3 for statutes and regulations protecting consumers. See also CRANSTON, supra
note 135, at 1-8.
171. See Daniel E. Murray, Under the Spreading Analogy of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 39 FORDHAM L. Rv. 447 (1971). Three factors support the spread of Article 2 concepts into
other areas of the law: (1) the need for a quick, available source by which to settle disputes in cases
involving small amounts that do not justify extensive research; (2) the drafters of the U.C.C. are also
drafting other documents in the law of contracts; and (3) "[tjhe Code lends an aura of authority and may
justify a judge in... doing something that he has been afraid to do in the past because of a lack of
enough clear authority to support his position[.)" Murray, supra, at 459.
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property,'72 courts have applied them to cases involving leases of
personal property by analogy.'73 Article 2A was drafted to cover chattel
leases, 74 but it provides the same warranties as Article 2t"s and is not
as widely accepted as Article 2.176 Thus, an analogy from caselaw and
current implied warranty statutes for consumer goods can create an
expanded implied warranty of habitability, covering the tenants "reasonable
expectations."' 7
172. See 3 RONALD A. ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, § 2-315:13
(1983). But see Breezeport Management Co. v. Maltbie, 411 N.E.2d 670, 673 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980)
(analogizing a commercial lease to the U.C.C. to determine that an exculpatory and indemnification
clause written in fine print was invalid as unconscionable under U.C.C. § 2-302 and that it violated an
implied warranty of fitness for ordinary purposes) (quoting Weaver v. American Oil Co., 276 N.E.2d
144, 148 (Ind. 1972)).
173. See Andrew M. Boka, et al., Special Project, Article Two Warranties in Commercial
Transactions, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 30 (1978). See also KPLR TV, Inc. v. Visual Elecs. Corp. 327 F.
Supp. 315, 324-25 (W.D. Ark. 1971) (declaring that the lessor should bear the loss because it had
greater knowledge), modified on other grounds, 465 F.2d 1382 (8th Cir. 1972); Cintron v. Hertz Truck
Leasing & Rental Serv., 212 A.2d 769, 776 (N.J. 1965); Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp. v.
Transportation Credit Clearing House, Inc., 298 N.Y.S.2d 392, 395 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1969), rev'don other
grounds, 316 N.Y.S.2d 585 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970).
Maryland has included personal property leases within Article 2. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §
2-314(4) (1992).
174. Article 2A was not completed until 1987. 18 U.L.A. 647-649 (1989).
175. U.C.C. §§ 2A-212, 2A-213 (1987).
176. See IB U.L.A. 1-2 (Supp. 1991).
177. The discussion below analyzes specific phrases that occur in warranty of habitability statutes.
1. "Fit for the uses intended by the parties"
Michigan's and Minnesota's statutes contain the language "fit for the use intended by the parties."
MicH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 554.139(1)(a) (West 1988 & Supp. 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
504.18(l)(a) (West 1990). New York's statute refers to "reasonably intended" uses. N.Y. REAL PROP.
LAW § 235-b (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1994). The court in Solow specifically analogized this
language to U.C.C. § 2-315. See supra note 142 and accompanying text. An analogy between these
statutes' language and the U.C.C. language should support an extension to broaden the scope of these
warranties in line with the U.C.C. warranties.
2. "Fit and habitable"
Alaska, Delaware, North Carolina, Oklahoma, West Virginia, and Vermont maintain the standard
of the warranty as "fit and habitable" without mentioning any life, health, or safety requirements. See
supra note 94. Additionally, although these statutes may require common areas to be "clean and safe,"
the statutes do not necessarily focus on the welfare of the tenant throughout the premises. To create
an analogy with U.C.C. § 2-314, the requirement that the dwelling is "fit" must be found as an
affirmative requirement and not mere surplusage to the habitability requirement. See Karl Llewellyn,
Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision & the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be
Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395, 401-06 (1950). Alone, the word "fit" may be analogous to U.C.C.
§ 2-314's warranty that goods "are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used."
U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(c) (1987).
Other state statutes actually mention health and safety. Arizona, Connecticut, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
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The same theory that forms the basis of the U.C.C. warranties applies in
the lessor/lessee relationship."8 The seller (lessor) is in a better position
to know the product and repair it than the buyer (lessee).'79 The seller
Tennessee, and Virginia adopt URLTA's implied warranty, yet have a life, health, and safety
requirement in their statutes. See supra notes 93-94. However, this requirement is added to limit the
building and housing code violations that create a breach of the warranty and does not directly attach
to the "fit and habitable" requirement. Therefore, because URLTA states that "[a] landlord shall comply
with the requirements of applicable building and housing codes materially affecting health and safety,"
URLTA § 2.104(a)(I), this wording may weaken the argument that "fit" means a different, more
demanding standard than endangering life, health, or safety.
3. "Fit for human habitation"
Statutes setting the warranty standard at "fit for human habitation" also create an analogy with
U.C.C. § 2-314. The analogy between the statutes is based on their common use of the word "fit" and
the assertion that the "for human habitation" language is simply stating the "ordinary purpose for which
such goods are used." Yet, one must further argue that "human habitation" should be construed
liberally to include factors such as similar dwellings or the tenant's reasonable expectations. However,
courts generally construe "habitable" as a minimum standard providing only the barest necessities,
Therefore, the language of these statutes must be analogized to U.C.C. § 2-314 which is broader.
4. "Repair"
Georgia, South Dakota, and Wisconsin have warranty statutes based on keeping the premises "in
repair" or "in reasonable repair." GA. CODE ANN. § 44-7-13 (1991); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§
43-32-8 to -9 (1983); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 704.07 (Vest 1981 & Supp. 1992). No direct analogy to
Article 2 warranties exists because these warranties are drafted to cover the sale of goods in which the
seller has no ongoing obligations. Article 2A only repeats the Article 2 warranties and is therefore not
helpful. However, one may argue that "in repair" includes the reasonable expectations of the tenant
because the landlord-tenant relationship is similar to the relationship between a seller and a consumer.
See Backman, supra note 4, at 3.
5. Analogizing from Prior Caselaw
In the absence of a statutory warranty, one must use caselaw to analogize tenants to consumers.
Illinois and Indiana, for example, do not have statutory warranties. Because some Indiana courts
explicitly recognize the historical foundation of the warranty of habitability as a change in contract
theory, one may directly apply contract principles of warranty. See Kahf v. Charleston South
Apartments, 461 N.E.2d 723, 732 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) ("The historical development of the implied
warranty of habitability in landlord-tenant law demonstrates that the warranty is grounded in concepts
of contract.'). Because a tenant is in the same position as the consumer of goods with respect to a
landlord or merchant, a lease of residential real property should contain the same warranties available
for the purchase or lease of consumer goods.
On the other hand, Illinois caselaw follows the D.C. Circuit Court's ruling in Javins. Within a
single sentence, the court both recognized the lease as a contract and limited the implied warranty to
housing code violations. Jack Spring v. Little, 280 N.E.2d 208, 217 (Ill. 1972) ("We find the reasoning
in Javins persuasive and we hold that included in the contracts, both oral and written, governing the
tenancies of the defendants.., is an implied warranty of habitability which is fulfilled by substantial
compliance with the pertinent provisions of the Chicago building code."). Thus, the stage is set for
competing arguments based upon the contractual and building code foundations for the warranty of
habitability in caselaw.
178. See, e.g., W.E. Johnson Equip. Co. v. United Airlines, Inc., 238 So. 2d 98, 100 (Fla. 1970)
(implying U.C.C. § 2-315 warranty into a lease in which lessee relied on lessor's skill and judgment).
179. See Backman, supra note 4, at 3; CRANSTON, supra note 135, at 2-3.
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is also better able to bear the risk.' Just as the consumer can no longer
inspect the complex goods available on today's market, the tenant cannot
effectively inspect the premises. Therefore, the duty in both cases should
be shifted to the seller.'8'
1. Warranty of Merchantability (UC.C. § 2-314)
The U.C.C.'s warranty of merchantability warrants that goods are fit for
their ordinary purpose."8 2 For this warranty to apply, the seller must be
a merchant.' 3 Under the U.C.C., a merchant is one who regularly sells
the kind of goods in question or one who holds himself out as having
knowledge of such goods.'84 The opposite of such a merchant is the
casual seller who does not ordinarily sell a particular kind of item.' 5
Courts vary as to how to determine merchant status. One test bases
merchant status on both the seller's knowledge of the product and the
frequency of sales."8 6 The buyer will presume the seller is knowledgeable
with respect to the product if sales occur often or on a regular basis.'87
As some sellers fit easily within the merchant definition, some landlords
who rent a large number of dwellings on a regular basis will also fit easily
180. See CRANSTON, supra note 135, at 157. The landlord may not be in the same position as the
seller because the seller can transfer and spread the cost among its consumers whereas the landlord has
a fixed number of tenants to whom he or she may pass the cost. See Backman, supra note 4, at 10.
However, the landlord is properly situated to tell the tenant exactly what is and is not warranted,
limiting the potential cost. Having had prior experience with the building, the landlord is also in a
better position than the tenant to anticipate the costs of upkeep and repair.
181. See CRANSTON, supra note 135, at 1; Backman, supra note 4, at 3.
182. U.C.C. § 2-314(1), (2)(c) (1977). Section 2-314 states:
Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable
is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that
kind.... Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as are fit for the ordinary purposes
for which such goods are used.
Id.
183. U.C.C. § 2-314 (1977).
184. U.C.C. § 2-104(1) (1977). Section 2-104(1) defines "merchant" as:
a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as
having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction or to
whom such knowledge or skill may be attributed by his employment of an agent or broker




186. See Special Project, Article Two Warranties in Commercial Transactions: An Update, 72
CORNELL L. REv,. 1159, 1197 (1987) [hereinafter Special Project Update].
187. Id.
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within the merchant definition.18 The more difficult situation occurs
when the landlord rents a small number of units. However, if the landlord
has even rented the dwelling once a year for the past several years, 189 this
should be frequent enough to give the landlord greater knowledge as to the
particular premises and the leasing process itself such that a court should
deem the landlord a merchant.190
Next, under U.C.C. section 2-314, the goods sold must meet certain
standards, one of which is "fit[ness] for ordinary purposes. '"' This
provision warrants that the product is reasonably safe and able to serve its
ordinary purpose."'
The traditional implied warranty of habitability already covers the
reasonable safety of the tenant. However, the "ordinary purpose" warranty
is broader. For example, a high-rise that does not have working elevators
may be safe, but it may not be able to perform its ordinary purpose-to act
as a dwelling from which the tenant can get to work and come home to eat
dinner. 9 3 The tenant may also want to use promised areas like the patio,
but if it is covered with mud, the tenant will not be able to have an outdoor
barbecue. 194  Although courts found these situations were covered by a
warranty, such treatment is not assumed under current laws.
2. Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose (U.C.C. § 2-315)
The warranty of fitness for a particular purpose is narrower than the
warranty of merchantability. The drafters' interpretation of section 2-315
188. See Jane P. Mallor, The Implied Warranty of Habitability and the "Non-Merchant" Landlord,
22 DUQUESNE L. REV. 637 (1984) (discussing the scope of the traditional implied warranty of
habitability as applied to different classes of landlords).
189. Even if the landlord is a first-time lessor, he or she may be considered a merchant, similar to
the seller who sells a first product. See, e.g., Alpert v. Thomas, 643 F. Supp. 1406, 1416 (D. Vt. 1986)
(holding that a seller making a first sale was a merchant because he held himself out as having
knowledge).
190. But see Zimmerman v. Moore, 441 N.E.2d 690, 695-96 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that a
lessor who rented her former home for the first time was a "non-merchant lessor" because she had no
greater knowledge than the tenant and was in no better position to absorb losses).
191. U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(c) (1977). Other standards, such as those in § 2-314(2)(a),(b),(d)-(f), would
not apply to leases.
192. Special Project Update, supra note 186, at 1208-09.
193. See Tower West Assoc. v. Derevnuk, 450 N.Y.S.2d 947, 951 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1982) (holding
working elevators to be part of implied warranty of habitability).
194. Timber Ridge v. Dietz, 338 A.2d 21, 23 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975) ("[T]enants had a
reasonable expectancy of a decent exterior environment from the sales promotion, the initial condition
of the premises, and the higher price of the apartment compared to others in the community, whether




limits its use to situations in which the consumer is using the good for a
purpose other than the ordinary purpose." 5 This interpretation indicates
that section 2-315 will not apply to the residential renter because all tenants
will be using the premises for its ordinary purpose-a dwelling. However,
many states apply the section 2-315 warranty to uses for ordinary purposes,
as long as the other requirements are satisfied.196 The transaction must
satisfy three requirements: (1) the buyer must actually rely on the seller's
knowledge and skill; (2) the seller has to have reason to know of the
buyer's purpose; and (3) the seller must believe or should reasonably
believe that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill. 97 Notably, this
warranty does not require that the seller be a merchant.198
As to the first requirement, most tenants will be forced to rely on the
landlord's knowledge of the premises. One or a few inspections will not
give the tenant enough knowledge about items such as ordinary noise
levels, quality of heating and cooling, and cleanliness of the building to
make an informed independent decision. The landlord, who has either been
inside the building numerous times or who is in communication with
someone who has, is in a much better position to know about the building
than the tenant.199
The second requirement is also easily met. The landlord should know
that the buyer intends to use the premises as a dwelling because the
landlord is holding the place out as such.2" More specifically, if a
landlord advertises that an apartment is suited to a particular group, such
as students, the elderly, or families, the landlord should realize that tenants
may want to use the premises with these factors in mind. Accordingly,
these tenants will have special expectations. For example, students might
expect the area to be quiet throughout the day to allow for studying.
Finally, with respect to the third requirement, the landlord should know
that the buyer is relying on the landlord's statements because this is the
only way the tenant will learn about the building. Accordingly, the U.C.C.
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose is applicable to residential
leases, and should therefore be included in residential leases in order to
195. U.C.C. § 2-315 cmt. 2 (1977).
196. See 3 ANDERSON, supra note 172, § 2-315:20.
197. 3 id. § 2-315:29.
198. U.C.C. § 2-315 (1977).
199. Backman, supra note 4, at 3.
200. Cf Ingalls v. Hobbs, 31 N.E. 286 (Mass. 1892) (finding that because the landlord should have
expected the tenant of a furnished dwelling to inhabit it immediately, there was a warranty of
habitability).
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provide tenants with needed protection.
C. Standards Governing Breach of a Reasonable Expectations
Warranty
In determining whether or not a party has breached sections 2-314 or 2-
315, courts consider the actual good in question. The sale of a mobile
home provides a close analogy to a residential lease. However, cases
applying the warranty of merchantability to mobile homes are sparse. The
Supreme Court of Mississippi has held that merchantability must mean
habitability, but this may only be a minimum standard.2°' Conversely,
the Supreme Court of Virginia has stated that merchantability is a higher
standard than simple habitability.2°2
Generally, under the U.C.C., courts applying the warranty of merchant-
ability first determine the ordinary purpose of the good in question.0 3
Courts do so by deciding what use the merchant could reasonably
foresee.2°4 Next, courts decide whether the good complies with a basic
standard of fitness. 05 Some courts use general standards such as whetherthe good is "reasonably fi ''206 or "reasonably suited"207 for its ordinary
purpose or for the purpose intended. Some courts look to the performance
of other products in the trade to establish a standard of performance.2 3
201. Guerdon Indus., Inc. v. Gentry, 531 So. 2d 1202, 1206 (Miss. 1988) (stating that the "fit for
ordinary purpose" standard of the U.C.C. "surely means that a mobile home must be 'habitable"). The
court held that the trial court had properly submitted the case to the jury even though evidence
suggested the mobile home was habitable. Id. at 1208. The seller had already made at least thirty
repairs, including replacing several appliances and fixing leaky plumbing. Id.
202. Twin Lakes Mfg. Co. v. Coffey, 281 S.E.2d 864, 867 (Va. 1981) ("IT]he fact that people may
be able to live safely in a mobile home does not mean that it satisfied the warranty of merchantabili-
ty.").
203. See 3 ANDERSON, supra note 172, § 2-314.
204. See, e.g., Global Truck & Equip. Co. v. Palmer Mach. Works, Inc., 628 F. Supp. 641, 649
(N.D. Miss. 1986) (declaring that a manufacturer could not foresee that a dump truck would be used
to haul something other than washed rock); Allan v. Chance Mfg., 494 N.E.2d 1324, 1326 (Mass. 1986)
(stating that a product's ordinary purpose is a purpose reasonably foreseeable by the merchant).
205. See 3 ANDERSON, supra note 172, § 2-314.
206. See, e.g., Salt River Project Agric. Improvement and Power Dist. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
694 P.2d 198 (Ariz. 1984).
207. See, e.g., Bell Fuels, Inc. v. Lockheed Elecs. Co., 474 N.E.2d 1312 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
208. See, e.g., Pisano v. American Leasing, 194 Cal. Rptr. 77 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). This
comparative standard may apply to leases if one compares the leased premises with other properties
charging a similar rent in the same or a similar area, and advertising a similar type of dwelling.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol72/iss1/10
19941 REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS WARRANTY
D. Waiving the Reasonable Expectations Warranty
The reasonable expectations test used in Solow would provide lessees
with the most protection," 9 but not without some difficulty. Under the
test, the landlord is at the mercy of the tenant's "reasonable expectations"
because the tenant can withhold rent from the landlord until the dispute is
resolved.2"' Determining a tenant's reasonable expectations may be
difficult, and factors such as price and geographic area may not clearly
indicate the types of amenities a court might find that a tenant reasonably
expected.2 '
Therefore, a landlord should be able to waive the warranty by informing
the tenant of what not to expect. The landlord is in a position to discover
the tenant's reasonable expectations and either comply with or change these
expectations.212 To ensure that a tenant is properly informed about what
not to expect, the landlord should be required to explicitly list such items
in the lease.2" 3 Such an exclusion should be clear and unambiguous so
that tenants will understand the meaning of such disclaimers.1 4 If the
landlord is forced to specify exactly what is not warranted, the tenant will
be on more equal footing, and it will be less likely that a tenant will
209. The words "reasonably fit" and "reasonably suited" are too vague. Being "fit" is a standard
found in many of the current statutory implied warranties and thus may not convey any greater warranty
than that already available.
210. In most jurisdictions, a tenant may withhold rent if a landlord has breached the implied
warranty of habitability. See SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 17, § 3:19. The tenant may then use the breach
as a defense to the landlord's action for rent or eviction. The tenant may also bring an action for breach
of the warranty. If the issue is resolved in favor of the landlord, the tenant must pay the back rent.
In some jurisdictions, the tenant is required to pay the rent to the court. This requirement ensures that
the tenant is not simply trying to live rent-free.
211. Michael I. Meyerson, The Efficient Consumer Form Contract: Law and Economics Meets the
Real World, 24 GA. L. REv. 583, 612 (1990).
212. Cf. id. at 611. Enforcing form contracts with the reasonable expectations of the buyer in mind
will force sellers to include the expectations in their warranties or educate the consumer so that the
consumer can assent or bargain further. Id.
213. Cf Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV.
1173, 1179 (1983). The party adhering to a contract of adhesion is not likely to have read or
understood it. In an informal survey, many lawyers and law professors admitted that they did not
regularly read form contracts. Id. In contrast, the contract envisioned here would be the result of true
bargaining as the reasonable expectations warranty will give the lessee the leverage to demand explicit
disclaimers.
214. As in the U.C.C. provisions on waiver, see, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-316 (1977), a reasonable
expectations warranty should require that the language be conspicuous.
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assume that certain services will be provided.2"5 Protection for the tenant
may be meaningless, however, if the tenant does not take the time to read
the lease.216
Extending the U.C.C. Article 2 warranties to -residential leases would
give tenants the same protections afforded consumers of other goods.
Changes from an agrarian to an urban society with complex structures and
specialization of skills supports this extension of consumer law.
Legislatures should also adopt the reasonable expectations warranty,
covering conditions over and above life, health, and safety, as a separate
warranty, allowing the landlord to contract out of expectations and avoid
the problems of determining the tenant's reasonable expectations.217 Such
a statute would keep the traditional implied warranty of habitability as a
minimum unwaivable standard to effectuate the public policy concerns
regarding substandard housing. Legislative action is the best method by
which to create a reasonable expectations warranty because it would create
a law more comprehensive than caselaw. In some states, legislative action
is the last resort for tenants as courts have expressly refused to create the
traditional warranty, holding the legislature responsible for such changes in
the law.21
8
Nevertheless, as URLTA demonstrates, state legislatures are unlikely to
adopt such a statute. Accordingly, the task of creating a reasonable
expectations warranty, if it is to occur, will likely fall upon the courts.
VI. CONCLUSION
The tenant does not yet have the same protections afforded to the
consumer of goods or personal property leases even though the same
considerations apply.219 The implied warranty of habitability has not
been sufficient to rectify this disparity.22 Thus, a "reasonable expecta-
215. For example, a tenant may not inquire about snow removal when signing the lease in the
balmy days of summer.
216. To increase the likelihood that a tenant will read the disclaimers, the tenant should be required
to initial each provision. Spaces for the tenant's initials could easily be incorporated in the new form
leases that would emerge. See supra note 159.
217. See supra part V.D. for reasons why the waiver is necessary.
218. See, e.g., Bedell v. Zapatistas, Inc., 805 P.2d 1198, 1200 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991) ("[I]mplied
warranty of habitability... does not exist in this state... ."); Miles v. Shauntee, 664 S.W.2d 512, 518
(Ky. 1983) ("[It is for the legislature to create rights and duties nonexistent under the common law.
."); Young v. Morrisey, 329 S.E.2d 426, 429 (S.C. 1985) (declaring that the implied warranty of
habitability does not exist for leases even though it exists for new home purchasers).
219. See Backman, supra note 4, at 3.
220. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text. See also supra part III.
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tions" warranty is necessary."
The implied warranty of habitability may be extended to include the
tenant's reasonable expectations through an analogy to the U.C.C. 2 In
most states, the judiciary is more likely to respond to the disparity in
consumer and landlord-tenant law than is the legislature.223
Barbara Jo Smith
221. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. See also supra part V.
222. See supra part V.
223. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
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